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ARGUMENT
I.
THIS
COURT
MUST
REVIEW
THE
DISTRICT
COURT'S
INTERPRETATION OF THE TERMS OF THE EARNEST MONEY SALES
AGREEMENT IN ORDER TO ADDRESS THE PROPRIETY OF THE
DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO KNIGHTON.
One of the issues presented by this appeal is the propriety of
the District Court's award of $8,845.50 in attorney's fees to
defendant Knighton.

Such award was premised upon and entered

pursuant to the terms of the parties' Earnest Money Sales Agreement
in accordance with the Court's finding that (1) time did not become
of the essence until fifteen days after the scheduled date of
closing; and (2) the delays in closing were due to the Lotts rather
than Knighton and Marsh.

In order to determine the propriety of

the District Court's award of fees, this Court must address the
provisions of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement under which such
fees are claimed, and determine which party in fact breached the
Agreement.

Consequently, Knighton's attempt to argue that this

Court should essentially ignore the provisions of the Earnest Money
Sales Agreement is senseless.
Paragraph N of the parties' Earnest Money Sales Agreement
provides for an award of attorney's fees:

1

Both parties agree that should either party default in
any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the
defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses,
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or
accrue
from
enforcing
or
terminating
this
Agreement . . . .
By

the

plain

language

of

this

Paragraph,

a

necessary

prerequisite to any award of attorney's fees is a finding as to
which party breached the terms of the Agreement.

Here, the

District Court found, in clear contravention of the substantial
issues of disputed fact, that the Lotts breached the Agreement. To
do so, the District Court was required both to interpret the time
is of the essence provision of the Agreement and to address the
factual issues presented by each party's performance.

On appeal,

then, this Court must consider the District Court's findings before
it can determine whether or not the attorney's fee award was
proper.
This Court's decision in Cobabe

v.

Crawford,

780 P. 2d 834

(Utah Ct. App. 1989), cited by appellees at page 16 of their Reply
Brief, is supportive of the Lotts' position. The Cobabe Court held
that, where the sales contract in dispute awarded attorney's fees
to the "successful party," the appellate court's role is to
determine whether the trial court erred by finding that there was
no prevailing party.

Id.

at 83 6.

To review the trial court's

decision, this Court necessarily had to consider the issue of which
party prevailed under the contract.
2

Here, the Lotts merely ask this Court to follow the precedent
of Cobabe and determine the propriety of the District Court's award
of attorney's fees by the only means possible:

determining

entitlement to such fees under the Agreement by resolving the issue
of which party in fact breached the terms of the Agreement.

This

does not amount to "rearguing the merits," as claimed by Knighton
and Marsh; rather, it is the only possible means by which this
Court may address the issues presented for appeal.
II.
KNIGHTON AND MARSH ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BREACH OF THE
EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT, REGARDLESS OF THE
INTERPRETATION OF THE TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE CLAUSE.
The crucial fact presented by this appeal is that the subject
sale was required to close on May 1, 1994, but the Lotts did not
receive the Note and Trust Deed necessary to close such sale until
June 9, 1994. Regardless of the interpretation of the time is of
the essence clause, then, someone breached the Agreement. For the
District Court to have held that the Lotts breached the Agreement,
in light of the substantial issues of disputed fact which were
presented, is perplexing at best.
Despite the plain language of paragraph Q of the Earnest Money
Sales Agreement, which provides that extensions of the May 1, 1994,
closing

date

are to be granted

only upon

certain types of

extraordinary occurrences which are not at issue here, the District
3

Court found that time did not become of the essence until fifteen
days after the designated closing date. As fully set forth in the
Lotts' Opening Brief, the District Court's finding is in clear
contravention of the express contractual language and prevailing
principles of contractual interpretation.1
relied

upon

by

Knighton

and

interpretation, Krantz

v. Holt,

constitute

authority

binding

Marsh

Furthermore, the case
in

support

of

their

819 P.2d 352 (Utah 1991), does not
because

the

issue

of

the

enforceability of the time is of the essence clause was not even
presented to the Supreme Court by the parties.
However,

assuming

arguendo,

that

the

District

Court's

interpretation was in fact correct, and the time is of the essence
clause did not take effect until May 16, 1994, fifteen days after
the scheduled closing, Knighton was still was in default. Knighton
and Marsh attempt to obfuscate their failure to perform by claiming
that the Lotts were in breach because they did not designate the
location of the closing or obtain a title report2. As the closing
1

Utah courts have held that time is of the essence clauses
will be enforced where performance is untimely or nonexistent
Barber v. Francis,
741 P.2d 548 (Utah Ct.App. 1987), and that
ambiguities should be construed against the party responsible for
drafting of the Agreement (here, Knighton and Marsh) Matter
of
Orris'
Estate,
622 P.2d 337 (Utah 1980).
2

Knighton also asserts that the Lotts were not in a position
to convey title because the property was in fact titled in Zions
First National Bank. However, as the closing agent, Marsh should
have discovered the defect, as he was obligated to obtain title
4

agent, however, Marsh was responsible for both of these tasks.
What Knighton and Marsh fail to mention, and what makes the
District Court's decision so puzzling, is the fact that, clearly,
one party was in default as evidenced by the fact that closing was
set to occur on May 1, 1994, or, even under the District Court's
interpretation, by May 16. However, the Lotts did not receive the
Trust Deed and Note necessary for closing until June 9, 1994. This
delay was due solely to Knighton and Marsh.

The Lotts requested

minor changes in the Trust Deed on May 16.

In light of his own

delay, Knighton's assertion that he did "everything required of him
to close the transaction by April 29, 1994" is flatly erroneous.
(See Appellee's

Brief, p.

28) .

Knighton

failed

to tender

performance within either interpretation of the time is of the
essence clause and was in clear breach of the Agreement.

The

District Court's grant of summary judgment upon these facts is
clearly unsupported. Consequently, any award of attorney's fees to
Knighton cannot be sustained.

insurance, and did obtain a Deed to cure the defect in title
shortly after the discovery of such defect. (See Exhibit H to the
Lotts' opening brief).
5

III.
THE MERGER DOCTRINE EXPRESSLY PRECLUDES ANY AWARD OF FEES
ON APPEAL TO KNIGHTON.
There is no basis for an award of fees on appeal to Knighton;
consequently, such an award must be denied.

The only potential

basis for such an award is the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, the
terms of which were extinguished upon the Lotts' court-ordered
delivery

of the Warranty

doctrine.

Deed to Knighton under the merger

This case does not present an exception to the merger

doctrine, nor is there any other basis for such an award, as
Knighton argues.
As fully set forth in the Lotts' opening Brief, the delivery
and acceptance of a Warranty Deed extinguishes the terms of a
previous contract for the sale of land. Secor
790,

792

(Utah

1986).

This

v. Knight,

principle, which

reiterated by this Court, Maynard v. Wharton,

was

716 P.2d
recently

912 P.2d 446 (Utah

Ct.App. 1996), applies with equal force to an attorney's fees
clause contained in an Earnest Money Sales Agreement. Espinoza
Safeco

Title

Ins.

Co.,

598 P.2d 346, 348 (Utah 1979).

v.

Here,

Paragraph 0 of the parties' Earnest Money Sales Agreement contained
an express abrogation clause.

Consequently, the attorney's fee

provision of the Agreement was extinguished by the Lotts' delivery
of the Warranty Deed, and its provisions are no longer valid.

6

Nor has Knighton identified any other basis for an award of
fees on appeal.

Knighton attempts to argue that the "collateral"

exception to the merger doctrine applies; specifically, that the
Lotts have a "collateral" obligation to pay attorney's fees to
Knighton in an action by Knighton to compel them to convey title,
including fees incurred to defend a resulting judgment.
The collateral exception was set forth by the Utah Court of
Appeals in G.G.A.,
1989).

Inc.

v. Leventis,

However, in Leventis,

773 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct. App.

the court found that the collateral

exception applied because the parties had clearly entered into an
express agreement collateral to the conveyance of real property:
specifically, the seller would remove certain equipment from the
building.

Id.

at 844.

Here, there was no such express agreement. The Earnest Money
Sales Agreement contained an standard attorney's fee provision with
an abrogation clause.

The Agreement presents a textbook case for

application of the merger doctrine.

Nor are the remaining cases

cited by Knighton of any assistance. Cabrera v. Cottrell,
622 (Utah 1985) and Cobabe v. Crawford,

694 P. 2d

780 P. 2d 834 (Utah Ct. App.

1989) . In neither case is the application of the merger doctrine
at issue.
Furthermore, Knighton has provided absolutely no support for
his attempt to rely upon Rule 3 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
7

Procedure as a basis for an award of fees on appeal.

This Court

has held that such sanctions are to be applied only in egregious
cases, to avoid chilling the right to appeal. Porco v. Porco,
P.2d 356

(Utah Ct.App. 1988).

752

"Frivolous" appeals have been

defined as those lacking in any reasonable legal or factual basis,
Maughan v.

Maughan,

770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct.App. 1989), such as

mischaracterization and misstatement of evidence and law. Eames v.
Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah 1987). Here, the Lotts have presented an
extensive chronology of disputed facts, in light of which the
District Court's decision compels review, as well as significant
issues of law regarding the interpretation of the time is of the
essence" clause.

Consequently, there is no basis for an award of

fees under Rule 33, nor has Knighton identified any specific
justification in support of such award.
CONCLUSION
Knighton and Marsh's argument fails to realize that, in order
to consider the issues presented by this appeal, namely, the
recoverability of attorney's fees, this Court must determine (1)
the proper interpretation of the "time is of the essence" clause;
and (2) which party breached the Earnest Money Sales Agreement by
failing to tender performance. It is simply illogical to argue, as
do Knighton and Marsh, that the propriety of the attorney's fee
award can be considered absent such determination.
8

Furthermore, an analysis of the disputed facts demonstrates
that the District Court erred by finding that the Lotts were the
breaching party. Knighton failed to tender the Trust Deed and Note
until well after the expiration of the time is of the essence
clause, even under the District Court's interpretation.

Knighton

has advanced absolutely no justification for his failure to timely
tender performance.

Knighton attempts to shift the blame to the

Lotts for failure to perform acts which in fact were Marsh's
responsibility

in

order

to

obfuscate

the

fact

of

his non-

performance.
Finally, there

is absolutely

no basis for an award of

attorney's fees on appeal. In fact, the merger doctrine expressly
prohibits such award. Knighton has advanced no argument sufficient
to overcome the application of the merger doctrine; the collateral
exception does not apply, as the parties entered no collateral
agreement.

Nor has Knighton suggested any justification for an

award of fees under U.R.A.P. 33.
Consequently, the Lotts request that: (1) should this Court
find that the time is of the essence clause took effect on May 1,
1994, this case be remanded to determine the issue of attorney's
fees to the Lotts; or, in the alternative, should this Court find
that the clause took effect on May 16, 1994, then the fee award
should be reversed and the case remanded to determine which party
9

breached; and (2) Knighton and Marsh's claim for fees on appeal
should be denied.
DATED:

January 13, 1997.
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS

v.

<%^.

MARK A. LARSEN
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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